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I. INTRODUCTION
Sometime in 2017, smartphone ownership in the United States will
exceed 222 million users, which will be equivalent to a market penetration rate
of over 85%.1 Although millions of individuals in the United States enjoy the
convenience of using smartphones, it is likely that few of those citizens
understand that government agencies have used those same phones to track the
location of individuals in real time as well as to access the significant and
* Shawn Marie Boyne is a Professor of Law at Indiana University's Robert H. McKinney
School of Law. She is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin-Madison (Ph.D.), Justus-Liebig-
Universitgt (L.L.M.), the University of Southern California (J.D.), and Cornell University (B.A.).
She would like to thank Melanie Reid for inviting her to participate in a panel at SEALS 2016 and
the staff of the West Virginia Law Review.
I Greg Sterling, Smartphone Ownership Just Shy of 80 Percent [comScore],
MARKETINGLAND (Mar. 3, 2016, 8:49 PM), http://marketingland.com/167275-167275.
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previously private information stored on those devices without a warrant. The
public's general lack of awareness of the intrusiveness of current law
enforcement surveillance is but one factor responsible for creating this
knowledge gap. Another root of the gap, however, is that the judicial institutions
that we entrust with protecting our rights cannot preemptively adjust
constitutional doctrines to parallel technological change.z Indeed, judicial
institutions have typically adopted a cautious approach to adjusting
constitutional doctrines to technological developments. For example, although
Apple introduced the iPhone in January 2007, it took seven years for the Supreme
Court to hold that government agents must obtain a warrant to search
smartphones seized incident to arrest.3
Many scholars viewed the decision in Riley v. California as a victory in
the battle to protect privacy interests in an age in which technology has
dramatically changed not only how we communicate with each other, but also in
how we acquire and store knowledge both about ourselves, but also the world.4
However, the trajectory of post-Riley decisions troublingly demonstrates that the
decision has not constrained the State's appetite for obtaining cellphone data.5
Most notably, police may still access cellphone data without a warrant if they
can argue that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment
applies.6 A larger problem lies with the limits of the exclusionary rule itself.
Evidence obtained illegally may only be suppressed if the State files criminal
charges, discloses that evidence, and actually intends to use that evidence at
trial.7 In addition, because the rule itself is not found in the Constitution, but
rather is a judicial creation, the Supreme Court has the power to craft exceptions
to the rule itself. In addition, if the State conducts a search without the knowledge
of the individual being searched, it is possible that a suspect will never discover
that the police built their case on the foundation of an illegal search. Put another
2 Joshua S. Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Technological
Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 502, 531 (2011) (arguing that courts cannot keep up with
technological change).
3 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
4 See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth
Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 2014, 12:37 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourth-amendment/.
5 Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Particularity
in CellPhone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REv. 585, 590 (2016) (arguing that magistrate judges continue
to issue broad warrants that authorize a search of the entire contents of the phone with no
restrictions whatsoever or have authorized searches of applications and data for which no probable
cause existed).
6 In Riley, the Court noted that the government did not argue that the exigent circumstances
doctrine applied. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 n.2.
7 Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1,24 (2010)
(stating that the Supreme Court has continued to narrow the exclusionary rule's application to focus
on only those criminal cases where the exclusion of evidence will deter police conduct).
[Vol. 119
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss3/6
A CA UTIONARY TALE
way, courts will only apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine if the
defendant "finds" the poisonous tree. Finally, the exclusionary rule does not
protect us in situations where state agencies elect to acquire information and use
that information for a non-criminal use.8
One might argue that the limits of the exclusionary rule, as well as the
rule's narrowing scope, has facilitated the weakening of privacy rights in the age
of hand-held computers. As cellphone manufacturers have worked to improve
the storage capacities and processing speeds of smartphones, government
agencies have increasingly taken steps to acquire technology that will access the
data stored on those devices.9 Today, many federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies possess pecialized technology that allows those agencies
to remotely search cellphone data without the phone's user even knowing that
the search occurred.
Using so-called StingRay tracking devices, government agencies may
track the location of a particular cellphone, access content such as text messages,
as well as record phone conversations.10 By mimicking the signals emitted by
cellphone towers, these briefcase-sized devices "catch" the international mobile
subscriber identity ("IMSI") of cellphones within a certain distance from the
device.II Using the IMSI, government employees may also find out who is
paying for a particular phone's service and download data captured from voice
communications, texts, and other data "stored" on that phone onto a computer. 12
Federal agencies began using advanced technology to capture cell phone signals
in the mid-1990s, and since then state and local police agencies have begun to
use the technology even in routine criminal investigations.13 According to a 2014
report in the Wall Street Journal, the federal government currently uses Cessna
8 Catherine Y. Hancock, The Exclusionary Rule, in Investigation and Police Practices
Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: I, 87 GEO. L.J. 1097, 1253 (1999) (stating
that the exclusionary rule is a judicially constituted remedy used in criminal cases to suppress
evidence obtained by the government in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to
establish the defendant's guilt).
9 Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the Use of
Virtual Force, 81 Miss. L.J. 1229, 1231 (2012) (stating that law enforcement is quick to exploit
the enhanced capabilities that new technologies provide to access data).
10 Kim Zetter, Turns Out Police StingRay Spy Tools Can Indeed Record Calls, WIRED (Oct.
28, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/StingRay-government-spy-tools-can-record-
calls-new-documents-confirm/.
I For purposes of simplicity, I will use the StingRay name to identify all forms of IMSI
catchers. Other popular brands include: Triggerfish, KingFish, AmberJack, Harpoon, and
Hailstorm.
12 Zetter, supra note 10.
13 Declan McCullagh, FBI Prepares to Defend ""Stingray" Cell Phone Tracking, CNET (Mar.
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airplanes that can cover most of the American population to gather cellphone
data. 14
Currently, law enforcement agencies in at least 23 states, as well as 13
federal agencies, use StingRay devices to track cellphone locations and access
cellphone data.15 Despite their intrusive capabilities, to use these devices, law
enforcement officers in most states need only to obtain a low-level court order
called a PEN register, also known as a "trap and trace," to obtain permission for
their use.16 The development and deployment of this technology by the
government enables agencies to indiscriminately search all cellphones within a
certain radius of the devices.17 Even in cases where the information may enable
the police to target a specific criminal defendant, it may be difficult for a defense
counsel to find out whether the police actually used the technology. For this
reason, the warrantless use of these devices seriously threatens individual
privacy rights and, arguably, our First Amendment rights.
Although both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security
currently require their employees to obtain a search warrant before using the
StingRay technology, in many states, law enforcement agencies use the
technology without a warrant. 18 In many cases where investigators have actually
secured a warrant to snoop on cellphones, the affidavit written in support of the
warrant has only vaguely referred to some type of trap and trace device failing
to inform courts that the device permits police to conduct broad sweeps of
cellphone users in the absence of probable cause.19 In addition, news reports
suggest that government agencies have begun to use the technology to monitor
and harass individuals exercising their First Amendment rights. Activists claim
to have detected StingRay use at the Dakota Pipeline Access protests in North
14 Devlin Barrett, Americans' Cellphones Targeted in Secret U.S. Spy Program, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 13, 2014, 8:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-cellphones-targeted-in-secret-
u-s-spy-program- 1415917533?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj.
15 Stingray Tracking Devices: Who's Got Them?, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/StingRay-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
16 Nicky Woolf & William Green, IRS Possessed Stingray Cellphone Surveillance Gear,




18 Sascha Meinrath & Jeff Landale, Opinion: The FCC Needs to End Warrantless Cellphone
Spying, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2016/1130/Opinion-The-FCC-
needs-to-end-warrantless-cellphone-spying.
19 Robert Kolker, What Happens When the Surveillance State Becomes an Affordable
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Dakota,2° Black Lives Matter protests in Chicago,21 as well as the protests in
Baltimore in response to Freddie Gray's death.22
Although our Founders crafted the Fourth Amendment to limit the
government's ability to intrude on individual privacy rights, in key ways,
advancements in technology have critically undercut the Amendment's ability to
accomplish that objective. Moreover, the weakness of the Fourth Amendment's
analytical framework, in particular the Supreme Court's use of a balancing test
framed around the concept of reasonableness, may ultimately threaten not just
our privacy rights, but also First Amendment rights as well.23 As government
agencies acquire personal information without probable cause, and in many cases
without a target's knowledge, it threatens not only our privacy, but our basic
autonomy as well. Consistent with the development of Fourth Amendment case
law, the front lines of the battle to restrict the State's use of technology to pierce
our privacy are located in the nation's courtrooms.
Consider the recent decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
case of United States v. Patrick.24 In that case, the court held that police did not
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy when they "found"
Patrick by using a StingRay device. Like other similar cases,25 when law
enforcement agents approached a magistrate judge to obtain a warrant prior to
the defendant's arrest, the agents did not inform the court about the nature of the
technology they intended to deploy. In fact, the defendant did not even learn that
law enforcement officers had used the device to find him until after his appellate
counsel had filed his initial brief. Although it is tempting to blame the secrecy
surrounding the use of the device on the malevolent intent of law enforcement
officers, court filings and FOIA requests indicate that manufacturers of these
devices have required state agencies to sign non-disclosure agreements prior to
20 Larae Meadows, Dead End Surveillance-StingRays and Civil Rights, NATIVE NEWS
ONLINE.NET (Oct. 7, 2016), http://nativenewsonline.net/currents/dead-end-surveillance-
StingRays-civil-rights/.
21 Fruzsina E6rd6gh, Evidence of "StingRay" Phone Surveillance by Police Mounts in
Chicago, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/1222/Evidence-of-StingRay-phone-
surveillance-by-police-mounts-in-Chicago.
22 Ian Duncan, FBI Admits Providing Air Support o Baltimore Police During Freddie Gray




23 David D. Cole, Preserving Privacy in a Digital Age: Lessons of Comparative
Constitutionalism, in FERGAL DAVIS, NICOLA MCGARRITY & GEORGE WILLIAMS, SURVEILLANCE,
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 95-116, 104 (New York:
Routledge 2013).
24 No. 13-CR-234, 2015 WL 106158 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 2015), af'd, 842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir.
2016).
25 McCullagh, supra note 13.
2017]
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using the devices.26 In some cases, prosecutors have either dropped pending
charges or offered lenient plea deals to keep the technology secret.27
In Part I of this Article, I will highlight the evolution of the use of
StingRay technology in criminal investigations in the United States and the
efforts by privacy rights organizations to elevate the standard of judicial scrutiny
of those devices. In Part II, I examine two ground-breaking 2016 court decisions
in which courts, for the first time, suppressed evidence obtained through the use
of cell-site simulator technology. Although United States v. Lambiss is the first
instance where a federal court suppressed StingRay-related evidence, the
decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in State v. Andrews,29 is the
first state appellate decision to uphold a trial court's cell-site simulator
technology-related suppression order. Finally, in Part III, I will argue that the
history of the government's use of cell-site simulator ("CSS") technology
demonstrates that in a common law system restricted to litigating current cases
and controversies, the judicial branch standing alone cannot adequately protect
individual privacy rights.
II. THE BUMPY ROAD OF JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
One key feature of the American judicial system is that courts may only
rule on the cases and controversies currently before them. Although this
prohibition constrains judicial power, in an age of rapidly developing
surveillance technology this constraint also allows law enforcement agencies to
deploy new technology before a court rules on the legality of that technology. It
may take years before attorneys have the knowledge, resources, and interest to
challenge the use of that technology in court.30 Even when that challenge is filed,
because of the limits on the exclusionary rule, a decision may not change the
outcome of a conviction. Consider the Supreme Court's opinion in Riley v.
26 Jose Pagliery, FBI Lets Suspects Go to Protect ""StingRay " Secrets, CNN TECH (Mar. 18,
2015, 3:15 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/18/technology/security/police-StingRay-phone-
tracker/.
27 Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case's
Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-cases-
undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-1 Ie4-aa05-1 ce8I2b3fdd2_story.html.
28 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
29 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
30 Statistics show that more than 80% of those charged with felonies are indigent and thus rely
on the representation of public defenders. Because of excessive caseloads and underfunding, 95%
of criminal cases result in a plea bargain. Alexa Van Brunt, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders
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California.3' While scholars and the media lauded the Court's decision to require
law enforcement to secure a warrant before searching a cellphone seized incident
to an arrest, the decision did not set the defendant free.32 In this Part, I will
highlight the reasons why government agencies have been able to use CSS
technology in criminal investigations for over two decades with little effective
judicial oversight. Section A discusses how law enforcement agencies hid the
use of CSS technology for decades from judicial review. In Section B, I discuss
the pivotal efforts of Daniel Rigmaiden, a pro se defendant, who used his time in
pretrial detention to file numerous discovery requests in an effort to obtain
information on the use of CSS technology. Finally, Section C discusses the 2015
policy change made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") which now
requires agents to secure a warrant to authorize the use of CSS technology in
most cases.
A. The Shell Game
Although American courts have only recently begun to examine the
issue of whether law enforcement agencies may use CSS technology without a
warrant, the FBI began using that technology back in 1995.
33 There is some
evidence to suggest hat state and local police agencies were able to begin using
the technology with little government oversight because the manufacturer
mislead the Federal Communications Commission about the technology's
capabilities and widespread use.34 In addition, some law enforcement agencies,
for example the Miami-Dade Police Department in Florida, only sought
permission to use the devices after they had used the devices in the field.
35 A
significant reason why agencies sought to keep the devices secret is that the
manufacturer of the devices, the Harris Corporation and the FBI, forced agencies
31 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
32 Kristina Davis, Won Battle, Lost War in Cellphone Search Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE (Aug. 1, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-riley-cellphone-
searches-warrants-gangs-ruling-20 15aug01 -htmlstory.html.
33 Kris Hermes, Law Enforcement Uses StingRays to Spy on Americans and Lies About It,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kris-hermes/law-
enforcement-uses-stinb_12080634.html.
34 Nathan Freed Wessler & Nicole Ozer, Documents Suggest Maker of Controversial




-t o l -
misled-fcc.
35 Id. It is important to note that the FCC has little statutory power to regulate CSS devices.
The sole basis of the agency's authority is a requirement that requires users to obtain a license to
transmit signals and a prohibition against devices that cause "harmful interference" to cell service.
2017]
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36to sign non-disclosure agreements. Despite the fact that the judicial branch
plays an integral role in guarding the boundary between law enforcement
activities and privacy in this country, the non-disclosure agreements sought to
prohibit agencies from informing judicial officers that those agencies planned to
use the technology.37
To maintain the secrecy required by these non-disclosure agreements,
prosecutors and government agencies used applications for "pen register" or
"trap and trace devices" to authorize the use of CSS technology instead of
obtaining a search warrant.38 Because pen register and trap and trace devices
simply record the numbers of all outgoing39 or incoming40 calls, rather than
collect the content of a call, in a number of cases government investigators
obtained a court order without fully disclosing the full scope of their intended
search or meeting the standard of probable cause required to obtain a search
warrant.4 ' Indeed, under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, an
applicant need only show that "the information likely to be obtained is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency" to obtain
an order.42 Although the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Maryland that
individuals do not have an expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that they
call or receive,43 the information received by CSS technology is far more
extensive and intrusive than the mere collection of phone numbers. In some cases
involving StingRay devices, because law enforcement agencies were not
forthright in disclosing the actual technology they sought to deploy, judges
36 See, e.g., Text of FBI Non-Disclosure Agreement for Harris Corporation StingRay, CTR.
FOR HUM. R. & PRIVACY (June 29, 2012), https://www.cehrp.org/text-of-fbi-non-disclosure-
agreement-for-harris-corporation-stingray/.
37 Id. The agreement prohibited disclosure of the device "in press releases, in court documents,
during judicial hearings, or during other public forums or proceedings." Id.
38 See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Police Contract With Spy Tool Maker Prohibits Talking About
Device's Use, WIRED (Mar. 14,2014,4:34 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/harris-stingray-
nda/ (claiming that the Tucson Police Department did not seek a warrant to use the device in over
200 cases).
39 "[T]he term 'pen register' means a device or process which records or decodes dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a
wire or electronic communication is transmitted." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012).
40 "[T]he term 'trap and trace device' means a device or process which captures the incoming
electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication." Id. § 3127(4).
41 Pen Trap, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/pen-trap (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a).
42 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
43 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
[Vol. 119
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approved Pen Register Act requests without knowing that law enforcement
officers intended to use CSS technology.4
A prime example of this strategy to hide the use of CSS technology can
be found in United States v. Patrick.45 At first glance, the facts of the case
appeared to mirror those of a run-of-the-mill arrest. The case began when police
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, arrested Mr. Patrick during a traffic stop in a public
place.46 At the time of his arrest, a court had issued a warrant for his arrest on the
grounds that he had violated the terms of his parole.47 When police found Patrick,
he had a semi-automatic weapon in his possession, despite the fact that he had
previously been convicted of a felony. The U.S. Attorney's Office subsequently
charged and convicted Patrick of one count of felon in possession of a firearm,
contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Although Patrick's counsel moved to
suppress the gun, a district court denied the motion after a pre-trial evidentiary
hearing.48 Curiously, the police reports used a series of ambiguous phrases to
explain what information had led them to Patrick's location. The reports claimed
that the police had "'obtained information' of Patrick's location;... had 'prior
knowledge' that Patrick was occupying the vehicle; ... [and] 'obtained
information from an unknown source' that Patrick was inside the vehicle at that
location."49 According to a report from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, six
months after the police arrested Patrick, the government "revealed they'd tracked
him through his cellphone"50 and "implied they'd gotten location information
directly from the cellphone service provider.,51 When Patrick's attorney cross-
examined a police officer at the evidentiary hearing, the officer stated that they
had received "electronic information" about Patrick's location.
52 When
questioned further about that information, the officer only revealed that it
44 According to emails obtained by the ACLU, police officers in Sarasota, Florida, would
attribute the information obtained by CSS technology to an unnamed confidential informant. See
Maria Kayanan, Internal Police Emails Show Efforts to Hide Use of Cell Phone Tracking, ACLU
(June 19, 2014, 9:01 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/internal-police-emails-show-efforts-hide-
use-cell-phone-tracking.
45 842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2016).
46 Id. at 541-42.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Jennifer Lynch, EFF and ACLU Expose Government's Secret Stingray Use in Wisconsin
Case, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FouND. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/eff-
and-aclu-expose-govenments-secret-stingray-use-wisconsin-case.
50 Id.
51 Id.; see also United States v. Patrick, No. 13-CR-234 (E.D. Wis. May 5, 2016) (denying
defendant's Rule 33 motion),
http://www.leagle.com/decision/ln%20FDCO%2020160506E87/U.S.%20v.%2OPATRICK#.
52 Lynch, supra note 49.
2017]
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involved "tracking [a] cellphone.53 Despite those disclosures, the court denied
Patrick's motion to suppress. He pled guilty and preserved his right to appeal.54
It turned out that the government's disclosure in the district court
proceedings were not completely accurate. After Patrick filed his opening brief
in the Seventh Circuit, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an amicus brief alleging that logs obtained
from the Milwaukee Police Department showed that the police had used a
StingRay on the day of Patrick's arrest.55 The brief also detailed that the
Milwaukee Police Department had signed a non-disclosure agreement with the
manufacturer of the device in which the department agreed to dismiss any case
if a court forced the state to reveal information about the device.6 Ironically,
only after the amicus brief was filed, did Patrick's counsel learn precisely how
law enforcement officers had found the defendant.57
The problem with using applications for "pen register" or "trap and trace
devices" to authorize the use of cell-site simulators is that by using CSS
technology, law enforcement may collect more information than a list of phone
numbers dialed or received by a particular phone number. Indeed, the technology
allows investigators to obtain the numbers of all cellphones with a certain radius
of the device, the location data of particular cellphones, and, in some cases, the
content of phone calls themselves. One problem with using pen register orders
to obtain judicial permission to use StingRay technology is that, in order to obtain
such an order, federal law requires that law enforcement officers specify a
particular telephone number or similar identifier. In most cases where law
enforcement seeks to use CSS technology, the agents may only know a general
location where a phone has been used and not know the particular number.
Despite the non-disclosure orders, it became more difficult to hide the
use of the technology from defense counsel, nonprofit organizations, and the
media. In some cases, in order to avoid disclosing information about the
technology, prosecutors offered generous plea bargains.58 In other cases,
investigators seeking approval of pen register applications encountered
resistance from federal magistrate judges. Notably, beginning in 2005, a number
of magistrate judges held that law enforcement agents had to meet the higher
standard of probable cause rather than the Pen Register Act's mere relevance
53 Id.
54 Patrick, No. 13-CR-234 (denying defendant's Rule 33 motion).
55 Lynch, supra note 49.
56 Id.
57 Patrick, No. 13-CR-234 (denying defendant's Rule 33 motion).
58 Jason M. Weinstein et al., Privacy vs. Public Safety: Prosecuting and Defending Criminal
Cases in the Post-Snowden Era, 52 AM. CiuM. L. REv. 729, 742 (2015) (describing a prosecutor
who offered a generous plea deal to avoid disclosing information about the technology).
[Vol. 119
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standard before using CSS technology.59 However, the decisions in the federal
courts were not unanimous in requiring that the State meet a probable cause
standard.6°
B. United States v. Rigmaiden
Surprisingly, it took the work of an obsessive and reclusive criminal,
who represented himself pro se, to expose the fact that government agencies were
using StingRay technology to find criminal suspects.61 In 2008, federal agents
arrested Daniel Rigmaiden who prided himself on living "off the grid." A grand
jury later indicted Rigmaiden on 73 counts of fraud, identity theft, and
conspiracy. After finding himself in federal custody, Rigmaiden filed numerous
discovery requests and over 1000 motions as he attempted to discover how
agents had found him.62 Possessing a high school education and an innate sense
of curiosity, Rigmaiden discovered how the government tracked his location
using a device.63 After Rigmaiden finally convinced the principal technologist
59 See, e.g., In re Application of United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (D.P.R. 2007); In re
United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F.
Supp. 2d 134, 134-35 (D.D.C. 2006); In re Application of the United States, No. 1:06-MC-6, 2006
WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006); In re Application for an Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Directing the Disclosure of Telecommunications Records, 439 F.
Supp. 2d 456 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application of the United States of America, 416 F. Supp. 2d
390 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application of the United States of America, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211
(W.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Application of the United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 827-37 (S.D. Tex.
2006); In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site
Information, No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006); In re Applications
of the U.S.A. for Orders Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Cite Information, No. 05-403, 2005
WL 3658531 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005); In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F.
Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that § 103(a)(2) of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 1002(a)(2)(B), required a showing of probable
cause to obtain a subscriber's location information) on reconsideration sub nom., 396 F. Supp. 2d
294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
60 See, e.g., In re Application for an Order Authorizing the Extension and Use of a Pen Register
Device, No. 07-SW-034-GGH, 2007 WL 397129 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2007); In re Application of
the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re U.S. for an Order, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Application
for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
61 Matt Sledge, Stingray Cellphone Tracking Warrant In Daniel David Rigmaiden Case Was
Proper, Judge Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 2013, 3:42 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/09/StingRay-cellphone-tracking-n-3247309.htmnl.
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for the ACLU, that he was not some tin-foiled hat wearing conspiracy theorist,
ACLU lawyers joined the case.64 To understand why the use of the Stingray
technology has raised Fourth Amendment issues, it is important to understand
the role that technology may play in a criminal investigation.
Unlike the typical criminal who may be tracked through his or her
address, social security number, credit cards, or family connections, Rigmaiden
actively sought to "hide" from law enforcement while committing crimes.
Ironically, the technology that Rigmaiden used to make his living by filing false
tax returns, namely a wireless aircard,65 ultimately led to his capture. FBI
investigators began their search for Rigmaiden by identifying the ISP accounts
that their suspect used to wirelessly file tax returns.66 Agents obtained this initial
information by serving subpoenas on Verizon to identify the Verizon aircard
used to file the returns.67 Agents secured an order from a district court to install
a pen register and trap and trace device to obtain information about the cell
towers accessed by the suspect's aircard.68 By using this information and a map,
a government agent was used to narrow the location of the aircard to an area
under one-quarter of a square mile.69 At this point, the government secured a
tracking warrant that authorized agents to use a StingRay device to communicate
with the defendant's aircard.7°
Even with the formidable legal assistance provided by the ACLU,
Rigmaiden eventually lost his quest to suppress the evidence seized during a
search of his apartment.71 Although it is true that the investigators did use a pen
trap and trace device to search for the suspect, there is a key difference between
this case and many other cases where government agencies used these devices in
a criminal case investigation. Critically, the government agents in this case did
secure a search warrant authorizing the use of the cell site simulator. Although
the affidavit in support of that warrant may not have described the device in
detail,72 the fact that the agents had secured a warrant led the District Judge to
deny Rigmaiden's motion to suppress. In addition, the federal investigators who
64 Id.
65 An aircard is a device used to connect a computer to a wireless network.
66 Order at 3, United States v. Rigmaiden, CR 08-814-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. 2012), ECF 1009
[hereinafter Rigmaiden Order], https://www.scribd.com/document/140453993/Rigmaiden-
Suppression-Order.
67 Id. at 4.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 5.
71 Id. at 2.
72 In an amicus brief, the ACLU argued that the warrant was deficient because it failed to
describe in detail the capabilities of the StingRay device. See [Proposed] Brief for Daniel
Rigmaiden as Amici Curiae Supporting Motion to Suppress at 1, United States v. Daniel
Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. 2:08-CR-00814-DGC), 2012 WL 7767586.
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eventually located the defendant did rely solely on the cell site simulator to find
him.3 In denying the motion, the court found that:
(1) Because the defendant obtained his apartment,
computer devices, and Internet access by using
fraudulent identities, he did not possess a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his apartment or those
devices.74
(2) The government lawfully obtained information about
the aircard's historical cell-site, sector, and distance
information as well as destination IP address pursuant
to an order under the Stored Communications Act
(,SCA").7
5
(3) Even if the government had violated the relevant
provisions of the SCA, the SCA does not provide the
remedy of suppression.76
(4) Before the government even located the aircard with the
cell-site simulator, the government obtained data from
the apartment's security system where the defendant
resided showing when the occupant of unit 1122 had
entered and exited the complex.77 The government
obtained that information by using a subpoena issued by
an Arizona Grand Jury.78
(5) Although the defendant argued that the use of cell-site
information for a 38-day period was unreasonable, the
court held that because the information was obtained
from a third party under the SCA, and the government
had to perform mathematical calculations to "locate"
the location of the aircard within a 0.25 mile radius, this
information was not equivalent to the data provided by
a tracking device.7 9
73 Rigmaiden Order, supra note 66, at 23.
74 Id. at 13.
75 Id. at 15. According to provisions of the Stored Communications Act, if a "governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that... the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation," 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2015), a court may grant the government an order that requires
"a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record
or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service." Id.
76 Rigmaiden Order, supra note 66, at 15.
77 Id. at 15-16.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 17-18.
2017]
13
Boyne: Stingray Technology, The Exclusionary Rule, and the Future of Pri
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The court also held that Rigmaiden did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the device that the cell-site simulator had tracked, namely an
aircard, because he had obtained the aircard using a fraudulent name.8" The
Rigmaiden case, however, led the ACLU, as well as the Electronic Privacy
Information Center ("EPIC"), to file FOIA requests nationwide in an effort to
discover the reach of the technology's use.81 When the FBI stalled in responding
to those requests, EPIC sued the FB182 forcing the agency to begin to release files
documenting the nationwide use of the device by law enforcement and the
federal government.
83
C. Change in Department of Justice Policy
As the media and nonprofit organizations began to report and challenge
the use of CSS devices, federal prosecutors themselves began to question the
wisdom of using applications under the Pen Register Act to deploy the
technology. As one example, in a 2011 email to Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the
Northern District of California, the Chief of the Criminal Division noted:
As some of you may be aware, our office has been working
closely with the magistrate judges in an effort to address their
collective concerns regarding whether a pen register is sufficient
to authorize the use of law enforcement's WIT technology (a
box that simulates a cell tower and can be placed inside a van to
help pinpoint an individual's location with some specificity) to
locate an individual. It has recently come to my attention that
many agents are still using WIT technology in the field although
the pen register application does not make that explicit ....
While we continue work on a long term fix for this problem, it
is important that we are consistent and forthright in our pen
register requests to the magistrates.84
Faced with a rising number of adverse decisions, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") changed course in 2015 and began requiring agents to obtain search
warrants to use the technology rather than simply filing an application under the
80 Id. at 13. The defendant used the aircard to connect his laptop to a wireless network.
81 Markowitz, supra note 63.
82 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 80 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D:D.C. 2015).
83 See Ryan Gallagher, FBI Documents Shine Light on Clandestine Cellphone Tracking Tool,
SLATE: FuTuRE TENSE (Jan. 10, 2013, 2:14 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future tense/2013/01/1 0/stingray-imsicatcher fbi documents shin
e_light_oncontroversial cellphone.html.
84 E-mail from Miranda Kane, Crim. Div. Chief, U.S. Attorney's Office Northern District of
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Pen Register Act." However, as I detail in the next part, despite the fact that law
enforcement agencies have used CSS technology without a warrant thousands of
times,86 only recently have courts begun to suppress evidence seized through the
warrantless use of that technology.
III. CELL SITE SIMULATORS AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Although the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from warrantless
searches, courts have rebuffed attempts to categorize the use of CSS technology
as a search. As detailed above, the main reasons for that reluctance is that courts
have concluded that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the location of their cellphone, either because the cellphone is located in public
space or because cellphone users have abdicated their privacy in their location
data through the third-party doctrine. Additionally, other courts have held that,
because CSS technology is not significantly different than pen register/trap and
trace technology, government agents need only show that the information that
they seek to obtain may be relevant to a criminal investigation to obtain a court
order authorizing the use of CSS technology. In the subsections below, I examine
the reasoning used by the Lambis87 and Andrews88 courts to exclude evidence
gathered through the use of CSS technology. To situate these rulings in their
factual context, I begin in Section A by briefly explaining the role played by CSS
technology in both of the cases. Section B reviews how law enforcement
agencies attempted to shield the use of CSS technology from judicial review
contrary to the intent of the Fourth Amendment. In Section C, I examine why the
courts in Lambis and Andrews held that it was inappropriate for members of law
enforcement o use pen register/trap and trace orders to authorize the use of CSS
technology. Taking that argument forward, Section D details why these two
courts determined that the use of this technology qualified as a Fourth
85 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy
for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-announces-enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators (announcing that law
enforcement agents must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause before using a
cell-site simulator unless exigent circumstances exist); see also Richard W. Downing, Acting
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement Before the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/830026/download ("The Department recognizes the importance
of considering individual privacy interests when obtaining different types of geolocation
information.").
86 Associated Press, Maryland Appeals Court Rules Against Cellphone-Surveillance Device,
BALT. SUN (Mar. 2, 2016, 9:21 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-
ci-police-surveillance-20160302-story.html (stating that Baltimore police used a StingRay device
in thousands of cases in 2015).
87 United States v. Lambis, No. 15-CR-724, 2016 WL 3870940 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016).
88 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
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Amendment search. In Section E, I explain why the courts rejected the
government's argument that, by using cellphones, individuals "consent" to the
release of their location data under the third party doctrine. Finally, Section F
explores why the Lambis and Andrews courts rejected some of the same
arguments advanced by government lawyers in United States v. Rigmaiden.
89
A. Case Facts
In the case of Raymond Lambis, the Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") first attempted to locate the suspect by using pen register and cell site
location information ("CSLI")9 ° for Lambis's cellphone in the midst of an
investigation into a drug-trafficking organization.91 Using that information, the
agents discovered that the cellphone was located in the general vicinity of a
specific neighborhood in New York City.92 However, this information could not
pinpoint the phone's location to a specific apartment building.93 At this point, the
DEA agents sent a technician with a CSS device to the intersection of 177th
Street and Broadway to pinpoint the phone's location by forcing the cellphone
to transmit "pings" to the device.94 The technician initially tracked the phone to
a specific apartment building and then to a specific apartment within the
building.95 Later that day, DEA agents knocked on the door of the apartment and
obtained consent to search Lambis's room.96 In this case, the government
actually obtained a warrant authorizing the use of the CSLI, however the warrant
did not specifically authorize the use of a CSS device to track the location of the
suspect's phone to his residence.97
The role played by CSS technology in State v. Andrews,98 was similar to
its use in Lambis. Baltimore police began looking for Andrews after a witness to
a shooting selected his photo out of a photographic array.99 After obtaining
89 Rigmaiden Order, supra note 66.
90 Lambis, 2016 WL 3870940, at *1 ("CSLI is a record of non-content-based location
information from the service provider derived from "'pings' sent to cell sites by a target cell
phone. CSLI allows the target phone's location to be approximated by providing a record of where







97 Id. at *2.
98 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
99 Id. at 327. Ironically, during the pre-trial period, the prosecutor assigned to the case
disclosed that the police had on two occasions used Andrews's photo in an array in which he was
not identified as the shooter. Id. at 330.
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Andrews's cellphone number from a confidential informant, Baltimore police
successfully secured an order pursuant to the Maryland Pen Register statute to
install a Pen Register/Trap & Trace and Cellular Tracking Device. °° After
receiving that order, the police asked the cellphone provider, Sprint, to provide
(1) subscriber information attached to that number, (2) 30 days of CSLI to cover
the period surrounding the shooting, (3) pen register data for 60 days, and (4)
precision GPS data from Andrews's phone.10 1 Using the precise, real-time GPS
locations provided by Sprint, detectives then proceeded to the general area where
Andrews's phone was reportedly located.102 It was at this point that the
detectives, like the DEA agents in Lambis, proceeded to use a CSS device to
locate the residence where Andrews's cell was located.10 3 Officers then arrived
at that residence and found Andrews sitting on the living room couch.
104
Although the officers arrested Andrews pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, they
never obtained a warrant authorizing the use of the CSS device itself.'0 5
B. Tackling Non-Disclosure
Although the law enforcement agencies in these two cases both used
CSS technology to locate the suspects, it was only in Andrews where the
investigating agents went to great lengths to try to "hide" the use of that
technology from the defense as well as the court. In Andrews, this effort extended
well after the defense had filed a supplemental discovery motion in an attempt to
find out how the police had found Andrews at that particular address.1 6 The
prosecutor initially responded to that request stating that the "State does not
possess information related to the method used to locate [Andrews] at 5032
Clifton Avenue."'0 7 Five months later, the prosecutor eported to the defense that
"ATT used a stingray to locate[] your client via his cellphone."108 Indeed, it was
not until the defense filed a motion to suppress the cellphone evidence that the
State filed a supplemental disclosure that identified that the police had used the
CSS technology to locate Andrews.0 9 At the subsequent evidentiary hearing held
to address the motion to suppress, the State finally disclosed how the CSS
technology operated:
100 CJP § 10-4B-01 et seq.; Andrews, 134 A.3d at 327-28.
'01 Andrews, 134 A.3d at 328-39.
102 Id. at 329.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 327.
106 Id. at 329.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 329-30.
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Tell me what the Hailstorm does.
[DETECTIVE HALEY]: What we get from the phone company
is the subscriber information. So, when we get the subscriber
information, it has a [sic] identifier on there, if you will, a serial
number. We put that into the Hailstorm equipment. And the
Hailstorm equipment acts like a cell tower. So, we go into a
certain area, and basically, the equipment is looking for that
particular identifier, that serial number.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And so, if a person is inside of
a home, that equipment peers over the wall of the home, to see
if that cellphone is behind the wall of that house, right?
[DETECTIVE HALEY]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it sends an electronic
transmission through the wall of that house, correct?
[DETECTIVE HALEY]: Yes. 110
A key difference between Andrews and Lambis is that the DEA agents
in Lambis did not intentionally commit any misconduct.11" ' By attempting to
adhere to the terms of the non-disclosure agreement with the manufacturer of the
device, however, they deployed the CSS technology without approval of a
neutral magistrate. Ironically, in the Lambis opinion, the court commented that
the agents in all likelihood had sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant to
use the technology.' 
12
A final noteworthy point regarding the disclosure process is that the three
judge panel that issued the Andrews opinion criticized the non-disclosure
agreements that many police agencies had signed with the manufacturer of the
CSS devices and the FBI. The panel remarked:
We observe that such an extensive prohibition on disclosure of
information to the court-from special order and/or warrant
application through appellate review-prevents the court from
exercising its fundamental duties under the Constitution. 113
110 Id.at331.
I United States v. Lambis, No. 15-CR-734, 2016 WL 3870940, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 12,
2016).
112 Id. at *3.
113 Andrews, 134 A.3d at 338.
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C. CSS Technology Is Qualitatively Different from a Pen Register or Trap
and Trace Device
The first key point made by both cases is that CSS technology is
qualitatively different from pen register or trap and trace technology. In Lambis,
the court found that the StingRay technology differed from a pen register because
a cellphone user has no control over the fact that a cellphone emits information
to a CSS device.' 4 The emission is involuntary and automatic. 115 Similarly in
Andrews, the panel found that CSS technology is different from pen register
technology16 and that Maryland's Pen Register Act did not authorize the use of
CSS technology.1 7 Because the Maryland statute at issue in Andrews paralleled
the federal statutory scheme, the panel used the federal framework to point out
that the federal statute does not authorize the disclosure of cellphone location
information. 118 Notably, the panel explained:
Looking then, at the federal statutory scheme, we note that the
federal Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA"), which delineates a telecommunications carrier's
duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for law
enforcement purposes, provides that "with regard to information
acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and
trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of Title 18),
such call-identifying information shall not include any
information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be
determined from the telephone number)." 119
It follows then that, because CSS technology is qualitatively different
than pen register technology, the lower evidentiary standard of relevance used
by law enforcement o obtain pen register or trap and trace orders is not sufficient
to authorize the use of CSS technology.1
2 0
'14 Lambis, 2016 WL 3870940, at *6.
115 Id. at *6-7.
116 Andrews, 134 A.3d at 358-59.
117 Id. at 354.
118 Id. at 356.
119 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2015) (emphasis added)).
120 Id. at 406; see also Lambis, 2016 WL 3870940, at *6 (stating that the use of a cell-site
simulator to obtain more precise information about the target phone's location was not
contemplated by the original warrant application).
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D. The Use of CSS Technology Qualifies as a Search
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States, 21 the Court
has tied the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy to the distinction
between private and public space. The development of technology, notably
technology's ability to penetrate physical barriers to "see" and "track"
individuals, has challenged the utility of the Katz reasonableness framework. In
both cases discussed here, the court noted that even though the use of CSS
technology does not constitute physical intrusion by the police into a home, the
use of the technology still qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment. In
drawing on the language of Kyllo v. United States,122 the Lambis court stated:
"Where ... the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.,123 Relying on Kyllo, the judges in Lambis
reasoned that, because the cell-site simulator tracked the "pings" from Lambis's
cellphone, and that technology is not widely available to the public, the use of
the technology qualifies as an unreasonable search.
124
E. The Third-Party Doctrine Does Not Apply to Cellphone Location
Information
One of the key stumbling blocks that defense attorneys have faced in
seeking to suppress cellphone related evidence has been the hurdle erected by
the third-party doctrine. According to the third-party doctrine, when an
individual voluntarily conveys information to a third-party, such as a bank or
cellphone carrier, the individual forfeits his or her reasonable expectation of
privacy in that information. 125 In both Lambis and Andrews, however, the judges
found that because a CSS functions different from a pen register or trap and trace
device, the third-party doctrine did not apply. Critically, while the pen register
device at issue in Smith v. Maryland simply recorded ingoing and ongoing calls,
a CSS device emits a constant "ping" that seeks out cellphones. Although the
Supreme Court held in Smith that the user of the phone had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed on his phone,126 in the Andrews
and Lambis decisions, the courts found that cellphone users do not consent to
121 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
122 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
123 Id. at 33.
124 Lambis, 2016 WL 3870940, at *6.
125 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736-37 (1979).
126 Id. at 742.
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warrantless government access to their movements simply by virtue of the fact
that they choose to carry a cellphone. 1
27
F. What Changed from United States v. Rigmaiden?
The Lambis and Andrews decisions by themselves are not enough to
signal a permanent change in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding
CSS technology. In addition to jurisdictional limitations, the fact that the CSS
technology located both suspects in their living spaces limits the reach of the
cases. Under the Fourth Amendment's post-Katz public/private space
framework, an individual's right to privacy is greatest within the confines of his
or her home. When law enforcement agents use CSS technology to track a
suspect's location in a public space, courts may be more reluctant to find that the
suspect's expectation of privacy in the location of her cellphone was a reasonable
one.128 Indeed, using the logic of United States v. Knotts, it seems plausible that
courts might find that the short-term warrantless use of CSS devices to track an
individual's movements in public does not violate the Fourth Amendment. A key
limiting factor would be whether the length of time surrounding the warrantless
deployment of that technology was reasonable given the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. Jones. 1
29
A more significant change between the Patrick decision and the two
cases discussed here is that in the period in between Patrick and the 2016 cases,
the DOJ, as well as the Department of Homeland Security, announced a
significant policy change-namely, that agents would seek warrants before using
CSS technology. Indeed, both the Lambis and Andrews courts referenced the
change in DOJ policy within the pages of their opinions.13°
Even taking note of these differences, privacy advocates can find
grounds for optimism in these two opinions: by finding that (1) CSS technology
is qualitatively different from pen register or trap and trace devices and (2) the
use of the technology constitutes a search, these two judicial bodies have
attempted to push back on law enforcement's secretive and unrestricted use of a
new technology.
127 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 349-50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (citing United States v.
Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2015), rev'd en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016)).
128 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the use of a GPS device to
track the location of a car was reasonable).
129 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that the use of a GPS tracking device
for four weeks was unreasonable).
130 See United States v. Lambis, No. 15-CR-734, 2016 WL 3870940, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y July
12, 2016); Andrews, 134 A.3d at 357-58.
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IV. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD
The fact that law enforcement agencies have been able to use intrusive
technology in this country for almost two decades without a warrant raises the
question as to the Fourth Amendment's efficacy in protecting citizens' privacy
rights in an age of rapid technological change. Looking beyond the structure of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the tale of the use of CSS technology is not a
story of the strength of the judicial branch, but rather of its weakness. Although
American citizens look to the judicial branch to protect our fundamental rights,
in this case, the actions of the executive branch, coupled with private industry,
undercut the ability of the public to not only understand how this technology
worked, but also how extensively government agencies were deploying it.
Today, the best hope that we have that this technology will not be used without
a warrant lies not with the future actions of judicial agents, but rather with the
actions of state legislatures and the DOJ's continued adherence to its own
policies.131
Two federal agencies, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and the FBI, played instrumental roles in subordinating the role of the
courts in monitoring the actions of law enforcement. In cooperating with private
industry to keep the use of CSS technology secret from the courts, the FBI, as
well as numerous local police agencies, sought to surreptitiously prevent judicial
review of the device. The appellate panel in Andrews detailed the danger of that
secrecy:
We observe that such an extensive prohibition on disclosure of
information to the court-from special order and/or warrant
application through appellate review-prevents the court from
exercising its fundamental duties under the Constitution. To
undertake the Fourth Amendment analysis and ascertain the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security, it is self-
evident that the court must understand why and how the search
is to be conducted. The reasonableness of a search or seizure
depends on a balance between the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers. The analytical framework requires
131 The Department of Homeland Security has adopted a policy similar to the DOJ's policy.
See U.S. DEPT. HOMELAND SECURITY, No. 047-02, DEPARTMENT POLICY REGARDING THE USE OF
CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department%2Policy%2ORegarding%20the
%20Use%20of%20Cell-Site%20Simulator%20Technology.pdf (one notable difference with the
DOJ policy is that the DHS mandates that its agents be candid with the court); see also Cyrus
Farivar, DHS Now Needs Warrant for Stingray Use, But Not When Protecting President, ARS




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss3/6
A CA UTIONARY TALE
analysis of the functionality of the surveillance device and the
range of information potentially revealed by its use. A
nondisclosure agreement that prevents law enforcement from
providing details sufficient to assure the court that a novel
method of conducting a search is a reasonable intrusion made in
a proper manner and justified by the circumstances, obstructs
the court's ability to make the necessary constitutional
appraisal. 132
Although the FCC possessed the ability to restrict, if not scuttle, the use
of this technology, the FCC failed to adequately investigate whether the
manufacturer's representations concerning the devices' potential use and their
capabilities.133 In addition, the FBI's initial decision to cooperate with device
manufacturers to mandate that law enforcement agencies not disclose their use
of the device to courts, defense attorneys, or the public greatly undercut the
ability of the judicial branch to review whether use of the device was
constitutional. Ironically, although both the DOJ and the DHS now have in place
policies that mandate that agents secure a warrant before deploying CSS
technology except in the case of exigent circumstances, only the DHS policy
mandates that its agents be completely honest with the courts about the use of
the technology. 
134
To date, the legislatures in 16 states have enacted legislation that requires
law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant before using CSS technology to
track the real-time location of a suspect.135 Although similar federal legislation
has stalled, 13 in response to public concerns about the use of CSS technology,
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform (Committee) conducted extensive hearings from April 2015 through
2016 that examined the use of cell-site simulator technology by law enforcement
agencies. 13 The Committee's final report stated:
132 Andrews, 134 A.3d at 338-39 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
133 Ernesto Falcon, FCC Helped Create the Stingray Problem, Now It Needs to Fix It,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/fcc-created-
stingray-problem-now-it-needs-fix-it.
134 See Farivar, supra note 131.
135 Those states include: California [CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2016)], Colorado, Florida,
Illinois [725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137 (West 2016)], Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, Utah [UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102
(LexisNexis 2016)], Virginia [VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3 (2016)], Washington [WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.73.260 (2016)], and Wisconsin.
136 . See generally Location Privacy Protection Act of 2015, S. 2270, 114th Cong. (2015).
137 See generally HOUSE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE REPORT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF CELL-
SITE SIMULATION TECHNOLOGIES, 114TH CONG., LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF CELL-SITE
SIMULATION TECHNOLOGIES: PRIVACY CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2016)
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While law enforcement agencies should be able to utilize
technology as a tool to help officers be safe and accomplish their
missions, absent proper oversight and safeguards, the domestic
use of cell-site simulators may well infringe upon the
constitutional rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, as well as the right to free association.
Transparency and accountability are therefore critical to
ensuring that when domestic law enforcement decide to use
these devices on American citizens, the devices are used in a
manner that meets the requirements and protections of the
Constitution.'38
Consistent with the themes of this Article, the Committee concluded that
Congress, not the judiciary, is in the best position to establish limits on the
government's use of the technology that are consistent with the Constitution.139
In reaching this conclusion, the Committee ironically cited the Jones opinion,
which preceded the Committee's report by four years:
To ensure that the use of cell-site simulators and other similar
tools does not infringe on the rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, the use should be limited, and a high degree of
transparency is critical. Furthermore, there must be a universal
and well-understood standard by which these technologies are
deployed.
Congress is best positioned to ensure that appropriate safeguards
are put in place. As Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan
pointed out in a concurring opinion in Jones:
"In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the
best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and
public safety in a comprehensive way."140
In the case of the warrantless deployment of CSS technology in the
United States, decisions made by executive agencies in collusion with corporate
interests infringed on the privacy rights of American citizens. Critically, the
collusion between the FBI and the device manufacturers to keep the use of the
technology secret hampered the ability of state and federal legislative bodies to
weigh in on the proper use of the device. Moreover, these efforts at secrecy
underscore the constraints that the judicial branch faces in attempting to balance
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/THE-FINAL-bipartisan-cell-site-
simulator-report.pdf.
138 Id. at 2.
139 Id. at 35.
140 Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429-30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)).
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the government's use of technology within the framework of an antiquated
structure of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
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